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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The announcement in the February number of the LAW REVIEW
that the address of Judge Meekins before the Wake County Bar
Association would appear in the next issue was incorrect. Due to
certain difficulties in the set-up of the present issue, it was necessary
to leave that address for publication in the June issue of the LAW
REVIEW.
Six YEAR COURSE IN COMMERCE AND LAw-Beginning next
year, a six-year combined course between the University Commerce
and Law Schools will be offered, leading to the degrees of B.S. in
Commerce and L.L.B. Instead of spending four years in the School
of Commerce as heretofore, the student may receive the Commerce
degree with three years in the Commerce School and two years in
the Law School. From the viewpoint of the Commerce School, two
years in the study of law by the case method, as it prevails in the
Law School, is the equivalent of one year of Commerce, for the
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reason that the law student studies many cases based on actual commercial transactions, especially in such subjects as Contracts, Negotiable Instruments, Sales, Agency, Corporations, Insurance, etc.
This study of actual commercial and business dealings entitles the
student to credit toward the Commerce degree, as well as toward
the Law degree. The student will spend three years in the Law
School and consequently will receive the Law degree upon the successful completion of his work. There is no change in the requirements for the Law degree. The change consists in giving the
Commerce degree for three years in Commerce and two years in
Law.
The advantages of this six-year combined course, leading to
degrees in Commerce and in Law, should appeal to many students
who desire to enter the profession of Law with a thorough grounding
in the complex business life of today, as well as with an understanding of the law as it affects modern business.
LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES BY MONUMENTS OR By COURSES AND
DISTANCEs-In a dispute over boundaries, arising in the recent Vir-

ginia case of Trimmer v. Martin," the facts were these: Plaintiff and
defendant were adjoining landowners, deriving their title by mesne
conveyances from the original grantor, through partition proceedings. The title papers clearly described the boundary line which
divided the premises, designating the same by courses, i.e., directions,
and distances. The evidence showed that both plaintiff and defendant, prior to the trial, were under a mistaken impression or belief
as to the proper location of the line, and plaintiff had built a fence
along what both parties thought to be the correct boundary. To
establish his right to hold his portion of the premises, defendant
contended that courses and distances mentioned in the title papers
always had to give way to known and reputed monuments, in case
of a variance between the two methods of determining the true line.
While conceding the truth of this broad proposition set forth by the
defendant, the court held that the rule could not apply in this
particular case, because the monuments relied upon were not mentioned in the title papers. Said the court,2 "The established rule
that the location on the ground of courses and distances designated
in the title papers must give way to known and reputed monuments
1

Trimmer v. Martin (1925) 141 Va. 252, 126 S. E. 217.
Idem, 126 S. E. 217, 219.
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has reference only to monuments which are designated in the title
papers. . . . Hence, none of the evidence with respect to the
location on the ground of certain corner stakes, or of the oak tree,
marked fore and aft, or of other things appearing on the ground,
mentioned in the evidence, but not designated in the title papers, can
have the effect of altering the aforesaid courses and distances as
.
designated in the title papers in the instant case,
Due, perhaps, to the infinite variety of facts upon which the
boundary decisions have been based, the law on the subject, when
separated from the facts from which it was drawn, and set forth
in abstract rules, appears to be in a state of utmost confusion. There
are, of course, a few fundamental principles and basic methods of
approach in settling boundary disputes, but beyond those the decisions do not readily lend themselves to classification. The greatest
difficulty seems to center around the problem of what weight shall
be given to the exact language of the deed, especially when two or
more descriptions therein are contradictory, and what, if any, weight
shall be given to the acts of the parties dehors the deed. There are
two situtaions around which any grouping of decisions, to be
effectual, must be made: First, where monuments are designated in
the deed, but to follow them would conflict with the courses and
distances called for by the instrument, and, second, where monuments, not designated in the deed, have been erected pursuant to a
survey or other acts showing assent of the parties, and to follow
them would establish a line at variance with courses and distances
mentioned in the deed.
Where monuments are called for by a description in the instrument itself, and courses and distances are also designated in the same
instrument, in case of a conflict between the two methods of descrihing the boundary, the law seems well settled that the boundary established by the monuments will prevail over that which would be
established by the courses and distances. 3 Not only is this principle
well settled, but it seems to be based upon sound reasoning. The
danger of approximation and of errors in surveying, due to poor
instruments, variation of the needle of the compass, or inaccuracy
of the person making the survey, all tend to establish the relative
weakness of this manner of describing a boundary. Statement of
contents, of course, is an even weaker method of description, and
' Whitaker v. Cover (1905) 140 N. C. 280, 52 S. E. 581; Sherrod v. Battle
(1911) 154 N. C.345, 70 S. E. 834; Lumber Co. v. Bernhardt (1913) 162 N. C.
460, 78 S. E. 485; Byrd v. Spruce Co. (1915) 170 N. C. 429, 87 S. E. 241.
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cannot be taken seriously in computing boundaries, since a lot containing two and a half acres may be popularly known as the "old
three-acre lot." Fixed monuments, however, especially when of a
permanent nature, establish a boundary without approximation or
danger of error, and leave very little room for dispute. The courts,
therefore, prefer to give precedence to monuments over courses,
4
distances, or contents stated in the same deed.
This doctrine of the precedence of monuments has occasionally
been carried beyond the situation where existing monuments are
referred to in the deed, along with courses and distances which are
at variance with the line established by the monuments. For
instance, in Lerned v. Morrill,5 it was held that monuments referred
to in the title papers as existing, control other conflicting descriptions, obtained through courses and distances, even though the
monuments are erected by the parties subsequently to the execution
of the deed. The facts of that case, of course, raise a rather unusual
situation, since non-existant monuments are not commonly referred
to in the deed as existing, but it serves to show the marked preference of the courts for definite boundaries, established by monuments,
over indefinite or approximated boundaries, established by other
means of description. Such a doctrine, however, is not carried to
a point of absurdity. Monuments may be ignored, if, to follow
other descriptions, would be to reconcile all other parts of the deed,0
or, if the fact that the other descriptions, in a given situation, are
more definite than the monuments removes the reason for the rule
7
as to precedence of monuments.
4

Pernam v. Wead (1809) 6 Mass. 131, 3 Gray's Cases 285; Newsom v.

Prior'sLessee, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 10, 5 Law Ed. 382; Riley v. Griffin, 16
141, 60 Am. Dec. 726; Johnson.v. Archibald, 78 Texas 96, 22 Am. St. Rep.
Fentress v. PocahontasFowling Club (1911) 108 Va. 155, 60 S. E. 633.
(1820) 2 N. Hamp. 197, Warren, Cases on Conveyancing, 163.
'See, for instance, White v. Luning (1876) 93 U. S. 514, 524, 23 Law
938, 940, per Davis, J., "This rule (that of monuments prevailing) is

Ga.
27;
Ed.
not

inflexible. It yields whenever, taking all the particulars of the deed together, it
would be absurd to apply it. For instance, if the rejection of a call for a
monument would reconcile other parts of the description and leave enough to
identify-the land-it would certainly be absurd to retain the false call and
thus defeat the conveyance."
' The North Carolina Court apparently treats this as an exception to the
rule. See Lumber Co. v. Hutton (1910) 152 N. C. 537, 68 S. E. 2 (syllabus),
"A natural boundary called for in the description of land in a grant controls
course and distance, for the reason that it is usually considered more certain;
but when the course, distance, number of acres and plat given are more definite,
the latter must give way to the former, the reason for the rule ceasing and
presenting a case which forms an exception to the rule." Also Brown v.
House (1895) 116 N. C. 859, 21 S. E. 938.
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The second situation, that is, where the monuments which are
claimed to establish the boundary are not mentioned in the deed,
may be considered 'to better advantage if subdivided into three
situations, viz: First, where such monuments are erected prior to;
Second, where they are erected contemporaneously with, and Third,
where they are erected subsequently to, the execution of the title
papers.
I. Where the monuments claimed as the location of the boundary
line are not mentioned in the deed, and are erected prior to its
execution, there seem to be certain objections to allowing them to
prevail over courses and distances mentioned in the instrument.
Parol evidence is admittd to vary a written instrument, and, in addition, it may be submitted that the acts of the parties in locating such
monuments are not the best evidence of their intention at the later
date when the deed is made. Such a doctrine does not allow for a
bona fide change of mind. For example, the parties, having in contemplation the execution of a deed may go upon the land, make an
actual survey and mark the boundaries. Later, before execution of
the deed, they may conclude to shorten or lengthen the line, and it
might well be argued that the best evidence of their intention at date
of the conveyance is the written description of the boundary. However, as the object of recognizing the precedence of monuments over
other descriptions is to get definite evidence of the intention of the
parties, and to iron out ambiguities in the instrument, the answer to
the objections above raised may be found in the theory that the
admission of parol evidence is for the purpose of explaining, rather
than for purpose of varying, the writing. It is, perhaps, on this
theory that our courts have allowed prior erected monuments, not
mentioned in the title papers, to control contradictory statements of
8
courses and distances.
II. Where the monuments relied upon are not mentioned in the
deed, and are erected contemporaneously with the execution of the
same, we have the same objections previously noted, i.e., admission
of parol evidence, and attendant violation of the Statute of Frauds,
though, perhaps, the objections are not, in this second situation,
present in such full force, due to the fact that a change of mind
between location of the monuments and the execution of the deed is
'Safret v. Hartinan (1857) 50 N. C. 185; Shaffer v. Gaynor (1893) 117
N. C. 15, 23 S. E. 154; Elliott v. Jefferson (1903) 133 N. C. 207, 45 S. E. 558;
Clark v. Aldridge (1913) 162 N. C. 326, 78 S. E. 216.
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not probable. In this second situation, too, our court seems to adopt
the view that the monuments so located should prevail over other
methods of boundary description. One fairly recent case, Potter
v. Bonner,9 frankly acknowledges 10 that the application of the
doctrine of allowing precedence to monuments not mentioned in the
deed is a violation of the Statute of Frauds: "The rule prevails
with us . . . that the description of land in a deed may be
enlarged or limited by evidence of contemporaneous survey, but the
rule has always been applied with caution because, in legal effect, it
permits the transfer of title to land by parol, in violation of the
Statute of Frauds, and it may frequently result in wrong and injustice. . . . The courts have therefore been careful to define with
particularity the circumstances under which such evidence may be
received and have only permitted it to control the description in
in the deed 'when the parties, with a view to making the deed, go
upon the land and make a physical survey of the same, giving it a
boundary which is actually run and marked and the deed is thereupon
made, intending to convey the land which they have surveyed.'"11
If justification be needed for the technical violation of the parol
evidence rule and the statute of frauds, it is, perhaps, found in the
desire of the courts to determine true intention of the conveying
parties, and their appreciation of the fact that overt acts are better
indicators of intention than written descriptions. Our court, in one
instance, made the analogy between this "practical location" of
boundary-line monuments and Livery of Seisin at Common Law. 12
While, of course, livery is dispensed with under our recording
statute'8 along with other ceremonies of conveyancing, the analogy
seems to be an excellent one, justifying a technical breach of the
"Potter v. Bonner (1917) 174 N. C. 20, 93 S. E. 370.
0The New Hampshire Court, in Hitchcock v. Libby, 70 N. H. 399, 402, was
not ready to admit the violation of the rule: "The locating of the line by the
acts of the parties did not create any new right. It did not transfer title to land
from one party to the other, thereby conflicting with the statute of frauds, but
simply defined how far title on either side extends."
' Double quotes by court, quoting Clark v. Aldridge, 162 N. C. 330, supra,

and cases cited.

' Potter v. Bonner, supra, n. 9, at page 22: "These requirements are not
only for the purpose of having the line definitely marked, but also to give
publicity to the acts of the parties, and is analogous to the livery of seisin of
the common law, where the lord, without writing, in order to invest the tenant
with title, went upon the land, and, in the presence of witnesses delivered a tuft
of grass or a twig from the land and declared the tenant to be in possession
of the land granted to him."
' C. S., sec. 3308.
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statute where the facts of the case show that the best evidence would
be excluded by avoiding such a breach. It is submitted, however,
for obvious reasons that, as the court has said, such a doctrine
should be applied "with caution."
III. The third situation, where monuments are not mentioned
in the deed and are located by the parties subsequently to the execution of the deed, is of course, a rather unusual situation. And yet
it has occasionally been held that even in such a case monuments so
located will prevail over courses and distances mentioned in the
deed, even where no ambiguity arises in connection with the description by course and distance.1 4 Against such a holding, all of the
objections raised in connection with allowing monuments not mentioned in the title papers to prevail when erected prior to, and contemporaneously with, the execution of the deed, return, and this
time, it is submitted, with convincing force. To carry the rule as to
the preference of monuments over courses and distances to such an
extreme would hardly seem justified by any plea of desirability of
determining intention of the parties. Instead of a mere technical
violation of the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds, it
encourages a tendency which would render those sound doctrines virtually obsolete. If, after execution of a deed, the line may be
changed so as to include ten or twenty feet additional, by subsequently erecting a boundary line with monuments, the natural quaere
would seem unavoidable: Why, then could not that additional ten
or twenty feet be independently conveyed without the formality of a
writing or deed? The step between allowing such a doctrine and
rendering the Statute of Frauds obsolete would be all too short to
be in accord with the basic principles of conveyancing. The court in
North Carolina has intimated, on at least two occasions, that it would
not follow the doctrine of allowing monuments erected subsequently
to the execution of the deed to prevail over descriptions by course
and distance in the deed, when the monuments were not described
in the title papers.1 5 It is submitted that this North Carolina dicta
is entirely sound in this respect.

D. S. C.
14

Knowles v. Toothaker (1870) 58 Maine 172, 3 Gray's Cas. 297; Kellog v.

Smith, 7 Cushing (Mass.) 375.
" Shaffer v. Gaynor, supra, 117 N. C. bottom page 23: "Hence it is held
competent to prove that a contemporaneous, but not a subsequent survey located
a corner at a place different from that ascertained by following course and
distance." Also in Barkerv. R. R. (1899) 125 N. C. 596, 34 S. E. 701, the court
places the reason for following monuments in prior or contemporaneous survey
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INHERITANCE TAx ON STOCK OWNED BY NON-RESIDENTS IN
FOREIGN CORPORATION-On March 1st., the United States Supreme
Court handed down its decision in the case of Rhode Island Hospital
Trust Co. v. Doughton.1 The question involved was the validity of
an inheritance tax imposed under the North Carolina statute. In the
case in question, a resident of Rhode Island died owning shares of
stock in the R. J. Reynolds Tobcaco Company, which has its principal place of business in this state and two-thirds of its tangible
property is located here. The corporation is a New Jersey corporation, maintaining a stock transfer office in New York City, and
the paper certificates representing the shares of stock owned by the
deceased at the time of his death have never been in North Carolina.
None of the beneficiaries under the will lived here. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that these shares of stock were subject tc
2
the North Carolina inheritance tax.
Chief Justice Taft, writing for a unanimous court, points out the
fundamental defect in the North Carolina holding, as follows:
"It goes without saying that a state may not tax property which
is not within its territorial jurisdiction. . . . The tax here is not
upon property but upon the right of succession to property; but the
principle that the subject to be taxed must be within the jurisdiction
of the state applies as well in the case of a transfer tax as in that of
a property tax. A state has no power to tax the devolution of the
property of a non-resident, unless it has jurisdiction of the property
devolved or transferred. . . . In this case the jurisdiction of
North Carolina rests on the claim that because the New Jersey corporation has two-thirds of its property in North Carolina, the state
may treat shares of its stock as having a situs in North Carolina to
the extent of the ratio in value of its property in North Carolina to
all of its property. This is on the theory that the stockholder is the
owner of the property of the corporation, and the state which has
jurisdiction of any of the corporate property has pro tanto jurisdiction of his shares of stock. We cannot concur in this view. The
on basis of estoppel, thereby, it would seem, excluding cases of subsequent

location. Also in the very recent case of Woodard v. Harrell (1926) 191 N. C.
, Clarkson J., in dealing with facts where monuments were
173, 131 S. E. .....
referred to in the deed, and the parties subsequently located a different line
said, (191 N. C. at p. 176) "Pinner and Combs, in 1907, compromised and
attempted to make a new line between them. This was not done in writing, but
by parol. If Combs and Pinner were locating the true dividing line, the evidence is admissible, but if they were changing the true dividing line, the evidence
was not admissible. There is no ambiguity in the calls of the deeds introduced
by the plaintiffs . . ." (Italics by the court).
' (1926) 46 Sup. Ct. Reporter 256.
2

Trust Co. v. Doughton (1924) 187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741.
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owner of the shares of stock in a company is not the owner of the
corporationsproperty. He has a right to his share in the earnings
of the corporation, as they may be declared in dividends, arising from
the use of all its property. In the dissolution of the corporation he
may take his aliquot share in what is left, after all the debts of the
corporation have been paid and the assets are divided in accordance
with the law of its creation. But he does not own the corporate
North Carolina cannot control the devolution of
property. . .
New Jersey shares. That is determined by the laws of Rhode Island
where the decedent owner lived or by those of New Jersey, because
the shares have a situs in the state of incorporation. . .
It was therefore held that the imposition of the tax was a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and that the North Carolina statute is to
that extent invalid.
The soundness of Chief Justice Taft's opinion is beyond question. The decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court was discussed in the June, 1925, issue of the LAW REVIEW, where the author
presented the issue and argued for the position now taken by the
4
United States Supreme Court.
In the same issue of the LAW REVIEW, there was a discussion of
the North Carolina case of Parks v. Express Co., 5 where shares of
stock in a Delaware corporation were held subject to attachment in
North Carolina, although the owner was a Georgia corporation and
the certificates of stock were not in North Carolina. This case
seems to proceed on the theory that the shares of stock in the foreign
corporation, doing business and having property in North Carolina,
are property here. In the language of the court, "The shares of
stock held by the defendant (the Georgia corporation) in that company (the Delaware corporation) was an obligation of the company
doing business here due to its stockholder. It was the 'property of
the stockholder in the hands of the company doing business here.'"
This language, and conception of the nature of corporate stock which
it sets forth, is the basis of the subsequent North Carolina decision
I Trust Co. v. Doughton (1926) 46 Sup. Ct. Reporter 256, 258-9, italics by
author.
'See Inheritance Tax on Stock Owned by Non-resident in Foreign Corporation,3 N. C. Law Rev. 107.
'Parks v. Express Co. (1923)

185 N. C. 428, 117 S. E. 505, discussed in

Attachment of Stock in Foreign Corporation,3 N. C. Law Rev. 103.
'Parks v. Express Co. (1923) 185 N. C. 428, 433, parenthesis by author.
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in the Rhode Island Trust Company case.7 If that conception of
corporate stock is wrong in the subsequent case, as indicated by the
present decision of the United States Supreme Court reversing it,
there is considerable ground for believing that it was wrong in the
previous case of Parks v. Express Co., and that, if that case had
been appealed to the United States Supreme Court, it would also
have been reversed.
R. H. W.

'In Trust Co. v.Doughton (1924) 187 N. C. 263, at page 279, there is a
paraphrase of the above-quoted language from Parks v. Express Co., making
the language applicable to the Rhode Island Trust Company case.

